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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-IS IT WORKING?
Labor-management relations have experienced a transition from an
informal relationship to statutory regulation by the several acts of Con-
gress between 1914 and 1959. Such formalization has resulted in part
from the desire to protect a substantial public interest. The primary statutes
which govern labor and management are the Sherman Antitrust Act,1 the
Clayton Act,2 the Norris-LaGuardia Act,3 the Wagner Act,4 the Taft-Hart-
ley Act 5 and the Landrum-Griffin Act.6 Perhaps the most important of
these statues is the Wagner Act, which forces employers to meet with the
representatives of their employees and to bargain collectively. This act
"legitimized" collective bargaining and effectively curbed "free-wheeling"
activities of employers which were often detrimental to their employees.
In 1971 one might have cause to wonder if the pendulum has not
swung too far in one direction. Industry-wide labor strikes have become
commonplace, with doubtful effects on the nation's economic health. Such
events prompt inquiry into the present performance of the collective bar-
gaining process as now constituted. A meaningful analysis requires a basic
understanding of the collective bargaining process in the United States, the
laws which gave birth to the process and those which seek to sustain it.
The purposes of collective bargaining, the forces which forged its forms and
methods and the problems presently confronting collective bargaining will be
presented. Union monopolies, government intervention, and consequent
imbalances in bargaining positions which affect collective bargaining will also
be considered.
A THUMBNAIL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
1890: The Sherman Antitrust Act
The Sherman Antitrust Act 7 was formulated by Congress under the power
granted to it by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.8 "The purpose
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 etseq. (1964).
2 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1964).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
4 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964).
5 Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1964).
0 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. H9 153, 158-60, 164,
186, 187, 401 et seq. (1964).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
8 The commerce clause of the Constitution provides:
"Congress shall have power to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States. . . ." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
By virtue of this power, in conjunction with the necessary and proper clause, Con-
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of the antitrust laws is to prevent a select few in a particular field from
achieving such monopolistic power as to stifle competition."" It was in-
tended to promote open markets and free competition in order to protect the
public from unfair pricing and mercenary tactics through corporate con-
spiracy to the exclusion of other interests. Injury accrues to the pub-
lic whether price fixing agreements are reasonable or not. While ini-
tially thought applicable to labor organizations,10 today the Sherman Anti-
trust Act does not deal with unions directly. 1 It is included herein to show
government willingness to curtail management bargaining power.
Although the government passed the Sherman Act to prevent corpora-
tions from becoming so powerful that they could exert unfettered control
within a given industry, this type of legislation has not been passed with
regard to unions. There has been nothing to constrain unions from attain-
ing the powerful positions which legislation prevents management from
achieving.
1 2
1914: The Clayton Act
The Clayton Act 3 was drafted to provide broader and more effective
relief, both substantively and procedurally, to persons injured by violations
of the Sherman Act. Section 17 of the Clayton Act specifically exempted
labor organizations from the antitrust applications of the Sherman Act.1 4
The rationale in exempting unions was that "[t]he labor of a human being
gress has authority to reach into local areas and regulate intrastate activity having an
appreciable effect on interstate commerce.
"It is the effect upon the interstate commerce or its regulation, regardless of the
particular form which the competition may take, which is the test of federal
power. United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 120 (1942).
9 Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 413 (5th Cir. 1962).
10 The antitrust laws declared illegal every contract, combination, or conspiracy, in
whatever form, which directly or necessarily operates in restraint of commerce. Loewe
v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 276 (1908). Thus in effect, working men who in concert set
a price for their services were considered to act in restraint of trade. Bedford Cut
Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927).
11 The development of the common and statutory law has been such that work-
ing men who act in concert to set a price on their services are excluded from the ambit
of antitrust legislation.
In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), Justice Frankfurter combined
the Sherman Act, the Norris-La Guardia Act, and § 20 of the Clayton Act and con-
cluded that labor unions were exempt from antitrust laws.
12 It would not be accurate to say that all labor groups possess extreme economic
power and have the ability to influence the market through their monopolistic control of
labor. Labor groups range in economic power from little power in the service indus-
tries and migrant worker areas to great power in the heavy industries of the nation.
Some unions are exploited while others are the exploiters. See Comment, Labor Im-
mnunities and The Public Interest, 44 TuL. L. Rav. 297 (1970).
13 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq. (1964).
14 Id. § 17.
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is not a commodity or article of commerce." 15  Therefore a group which
formed for collective bargaining purposes was not considered as acting in
restraint of trade or in a conspiracy since a man's labor is not a commodity to
which the Commerce Clause and the Sherman Act can be applied. In the
Clayton Act Congress expressed a policy toward unions opposite to the
policy expressed toward management by the Sherman Act. At the time
unions were viewed as a socially beneficial combination. An employee,
standing alone, was helpless in dealing with management. In order to be ef-
fective in "a lawful economic struggle ... between employer and employees
as to the share or division between them of the joint product of labor and
capital . . ."16 it was recognized as essential that this combination must
necessarily extend beyond one shop.
The effect of this disparity of policy was to subject businessmen engaged
in price fixing to the antitrust laws, while laborers engaged in comparable
activity remained free to fix the price of their labor.
17
1932: The Norris-LaGuardia Act
The Norris-LaGuardia Act18 was passed in order to curtail and regulate
the jurisdiction of courts, as well as to further the rights of laboring men to
organize and bargain collectively. This congressional action was 'taken be-
cause the purpose of the Clayton Act had become frustrated by protracted
judicial construction1 9 which lead to abuses in the application of injunctions
against unions.
By 1932 it was apparent that despite the provisions of the Clayton Act
exempting unions from antitrust regulation, many federal courts persisted
in issuing injunctions on grounds that union activities constituted conspiracies
to violate the Sherman Act.
20
The Norris-La Guardia Act removed the fetters upon trade union activities, which
according to judicial construction § 20 of the Clayton Act had left untouched, by
still further narrowing the circumstances under which the federal courts could grant
injunctions in labor disputes.
2 1
The overall policy of Congress was to encourage the use of non-judicial
processes of negotiation, mediation and arbitration for the adjustment of la-
bor disputes. One ostensible reason for this choice of congressional policy
15 Id.
16 American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209
(1921).
17 J. Williams, Labor and the Antitrust Laws, in LABOR LAw DEVELOPNMNTS 5, 6-7
(Southwestern Legal Foundation ed. 1966).
18 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964).
19 Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
20 See Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37
(1927); American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184
(1921); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
21 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941).
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was the significant cost factor in judicially litigated disputes. By analogy it is
generally recognized that the cost involved in antitrust enforcement is a
substantial burden on the federal budget. The Justice Department Anti-
trust Division budget has recently been computed to be in the range of four
million dollars annually, funding a staff of over one hundred attorneys in-
volved in the litigation and enforcement of present and past decrees. 22 Fur-
thermore, antitrust enforcement consumes a considerable amount of the
courts' time, adding to already crowded calendars. 23 To include settlement
of labor disputes in this cluttered environment would undoubtedly multiply
cost and court congestion still further. Thus by "unfettering" unions
from antitrust restraints while encouraging negotiation, meditation and arbi-
tration to settle labor disputes, the Act had a pronounced effect on strength-
ening the union bargaining position.
1935: The Wagner Act
The Wagner Act24 was primarily designed to promote industrial peace
and stability "by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining."' 25 Section 3 of the Act20 created the five-man National Labor Re-
lations Board (NLRB) to act as the body to oversee and implement the
Act. Members are appointed by the President for five-year terms with the
consent of the Senate. 27 "[W]here the Board has acted properly within its
designated sphere, the court is required to grant enforcement of the Board's
order."
'28
Through the process of collective bargaining Congress hoped to stimulate
a free flow of interstate commerce, while at the same time substituting "a
rule of law for the arbitrary and capricious power of the boss."'20 The Act
specified certain rights of employees relative to collective bargaining, how-
ever no mention was made of employers' rights. Thus the Act declared con-
gressional policy to be the protection of "the exercise by workers of full free-
dom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotitating the terms and conditions
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection."8 0
22 A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 374
(1966). The tremendous cost and burden of antitrust enforcement has led the at-
torney general to recommend "negotiation [of consent settlements] . . .whenever the
Division deems it feasible for efficient enforcement." Id. at 374 n.1, citing 1955 ATr'y
GEN. NAT. COMM. REP'T ch. VIII, at 360.
23 A. NEALE, supra note 22, at 375.
24 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1964).
25 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W. R.R., 321 U.S. 50 (1944).
26 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1964).
27 Id. § 151(a).
28 NLRB v. Warren Co., 350 U.S. 107, 112 (1956).
29 A. Cox, Procedure and Creativity, in LABoR ARBrrRATION-PRSPFCTIVES AND
PROBLEMS 253-54 (BNA ed. 1964).
30 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
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The Act noted the inequality of bargaining power of employees who
did not possess freedom of association necessary to allow them to organize
and contrasted this to the solidly organized position of the employers. It
was determined that such inequality unduly burdened and affected the flow
of commerce and aggravated the total business situation in the economy.
This imbalance further aggravated the economy by depressing wage rates
and the purchasing power of wage earners and preventing the stabilization
of competitive wage rates between industries. The consequences of the De-
pression were a catalytic source of inspiration for the Wagner Act. Grow-
ing out of the catastrophy of the thirties was an ever constant realization that
"laissez faire" was not the best of all possible worlds. It had become evident
that the optimism in individual ability to maintain social and economic sta-
bility should be supplanted by group and state initiative. 31 The Wagner Act
was a realization of this evolving desire, and introduced limited govern-
mental involvement in the corporate realm to vindicate the rights of the
worker.32 Thus "the Wagner Act further intended that despite the func-
tioning of the NLRB the purposes of collective bargaining could best be ac-
complished through minimal government intervention. '3 3 In theory the pro-
cess of collective bargaining was to be self-effectuating and the government
was to step out of the picture once the two parties had been brought together
under the Act.
1947: The Taft-Hartley Act
The Taft-Hartley Act34 was passed as a response to management's pleas
for help after a 12-year period during which unions had thrived under the
Wagner Act in the prosperity of the sellers' market then existing. The 12-
year period had witnessed a four-fold increase in union membership from 4
million in 1935 to over 14 million in 1947. In such vital areas of national
importance as trucking, mining, construction and the railroads over four-
fifths of the laborers worked under collective bargaining agreements.3 5
Strikes had become commonplace and union power, vested in the hands of a
few, equaled or exceeded that of the largest corporations.
While unions had multiplied in size and strength, management freedoms
under collective bargaining had been limited by the National War Labor
Board which altered labor relations from a union struggle for recognition to
a situation where wages were the mere starting point for further negotiations
on a variety of topics. What had previously been areas of exclusive manage-
31 See N. CHAMBERLAIN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 301 (1951).
32 The major architect of the Act viewed workers as "caught in the labyrinth of
modem industrialism and dwarfed by the size of corporate enterprise ...... 79 CONG.
REc. 7565 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
33 AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 56 (1967).
34 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1964).
85 A. Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 12-13 (1960).
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ment prerogative were thrown into the arena of permissible collective bar-
gaining topics. The need to restrict the unions' activities, by giving manage-
ment equal strength to negotiate, prompted the passage of the Taft-Hartley
Act.
The purposes of the Act were to delineate both union and management
rights, to provide peaceful procedures to protect such rights, to set out the
individual's relationship to his labor organization and to define and struc-
ture proper practices between unions and management in light of the general
welfare.
There is little doubt that such government intervention was needed, how-
ever it was passed clearly in the face of the ideals of the Wagner Act which
had envisioned a minimal amount of government intervention. The Wagner
Act had intended that the parties should resolve their own differences
while working within the guidelines of the Act. Failure of the bargaining
parties to resolve their problems is tolerated for a limited time and then
public pressure forces governmental intervention. The purpose in discus-
sing the Taft-Hartley Act is to indicate that government has responded to
changed conditions and has initiated legislation required to facilitate collec-
tive bargaining.
Together with the Wagner Act, Taft-Hartley expresses federal labor pol-
icy as the "promotion of collective bargaining; to encourage the employer
and the representative of the employees to establish, through collective
negotiation, their own charter for the ordering of industrial relations, and
thereby to minimize industrial strife."36 However the inequities which collec-
tive bargaining sought to correct have again arisen with the ever present
variables of social change.37 The imbalance now has shifted in favor of
labor. The question which remains unanswered is whether or not government
will again seek to restore the equilibrium in union-management relations
which presently is lacking in collective bargaining.
An attempt to pass legislation that would have curbed unions' economic
power was made in 1946. At that time, under the Truman administration,
Congress approved and sent a bill" to the Chief Executive that was designed
to subject unions to controls similar to those of the Sherman Act for cor-
porations. President Truman vetoed the measure and an attempted over-
ride by Congress failed by five votes.
UNION POWER TODAY: THE NEW PROBLEM
The public policy underlying this impressive array of legislation was to al-
low union development while preventing management from forming power-
36 Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295 (1959).
37 To gain a perspective of the diverse views as to the present effectiveness of collec-
tive bargaining in a changing social setting see B. Kmsa, AUTOMATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAIING (1964).
38 H.R. 4908, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
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ful monopolies. This policy has, in fact, been implemented and the legisla-
tion has in most respects succeeded, perhaps too well.
Today, we have passed through this formative stage of union develop-
ment and the purposes behind the past legislation have become moot for the
larger unions. In the words of Robert Kennedy, speaking about the size
of the Teamsters Union, it is a "union so powerful, that it is certainly the
mightiest single organization in the United States next to the government
itself." 39
International labor unions are powerful both in dollars and also in the in-
fluence they have over individuals and communities. "Unions have incomes
of over $1.4 billion a year in dues and investment income. They receive
over $80 million a month dues money." 40  This money is used in politics
to support candidates favorable to union goals and is invested in banks, fac-
tories and insurance companies. "Jobs are controlled through hiring halls
and through compulsory membership, in order to keep a job a person must
pay his dues to the union."'4 1  Unions are permitted to compel members
of a union to pay dues as a permissible method of enforcing "union secur-
ity" 42 against the members. 43  This growth of union power must be ac-
knowledged by government if the balance which was their original purpose
is to be restored.
By virtue of their exemption from the restrictions of antitrust regulation,
unions are free to impede competition unless they join with non-labor
groups. 44 The application of this broad federal labor policy to unions
prohibits only a certain means to an end: combining with non-labor groups.
It does not prohibit the end result itself, restraint of trade. The test is not
39 Comment, supra note 12, at 299 n.15.
40 Panel discussion between Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and
Congressman David Martin of Nebraska on the "What's The Issue?" radio program of
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, August 5, 1962. "Union Monopoly Power" was the
subject of discussion. [Hereinafter referred to as "Union Monopoly Power"].
41 Id.
42 "Union security" is the term for the collective means used to obtain union recog-
nition and to maintain continued union existence and viability. Within the framework
of the union-management relationship, union security may include: (1) Management's
recognition of the unions as the sole bargaining agent for its employees; (2) Maintain-
ance of union membership by setting a deadline for a new employee to join the union;
(3) Mandatory payment of dues by the union member or a deduction from his salary.
This firmly implants the union in the company while setting out the member's responsi-
bilities and allegiance to his elected representatives. J. BARBASH, THE PRACIcE OF
UNIoNMsm 156 (1956).
43 See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); A. Nabakowski Co.,
148 N.L.R.B. 876 (1964). In both of these cases it was decided that the only form of
discrimination which labor organizations could exert against their members was requir-
ing the payment of dues. If dues were unpaid it was grounds for dismissal by the em-
ployer at the request of the union.
44 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 233 (1941).
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whether a union limited or restrained trade but whether a union "combined
with management" and therefore, since management is present, violated the
Sherman Act. This concept of a union combining with management was used
in United Mine Workers v. Pennington.
45
In Pennington, a suit was initiated by the trustee of UMW's welfare and
retirement fund against the owners of a coal company. The suit was
founded on a claim for royalty payments under a national agreement.40 The
coal company filed a cross-complaint alleging violations of the conspiracy
provisions of the antitrust laws.
In essence, the cross-complaint set forth allegations arising from a 1950
wage agreement. The UMW had agreed to abandon opposition to working
hours in an attempt to allow the larger operators to increase production.
Through a process of rapid mechanization and union financing, wages would
gradually increase with increasing production and royalty payments to the
union pension fund would be correspondingly raised. The terms of the
agreement were imposed on all operators, regardless of their financial
status.47
Subsequently, in an effort to increase wages, further steps were taken
to exclude non-union operators from the coal industry. The combined ef-
forts of the union and large coal companies brought forth the Walsh-Healey
Act.48 Minimum wage standards were required for employees of TVA
contracted coal companies. In effect, small companies were now faced
with the union imposed burden of meeting minimum wage rates or losing
the TVA market for their coal output. Further pressure was exerted on the
TVA to gradually purchase coal solely from union companies. The final
phase of the program culminated in a "destructive and collusive price-cut-
ting campaign" in which four of the larger coal companies sought control
of the TVA market. The union had its greatest investment and most ad-
vantageous position of control in two of these -four companies.40  In Pen-
nington, the aspect of union self-interest was held to violate the Sherman
Act because it was an attempt to control the prices and production of coal
through a multi-employer bargaining agreement. The union had agreed
to work with management to freeze out the smaller mines. The union was
held to have strayed from its exempted area of "self-interests" and to have
combined with a non-labor group in restraint of trade. To prevent such sit-
uations from arising where a bargaining relationship is impaired because of
45 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Comment, supra note 12, at 298.
46 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950, as amended, Sept. 29, 1952,
executed by the Philips Brothers Coal Company and the United Mine Workers of
America on Oct. 1, 1953, and re-executed on Sept. 8, 1955 and Oct. 22, 1956. 381 U.S.
at 659.
47 381 U.S. at 659-60.
48 41 U.S.C. § 35 et seq. (1958).
49 381 U.S. at 660-61.
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an imbalance between the parties, the government should attempt "to allo-
cate to unions power enough to gain for their members a fair share of their
labor's product, but less power than would enable them to press upon the
society economic side effects disproportionate to their contributions to the
social order." 50  Specifically, the adverse side effects are wage-push spirals
which lead to inflation. The strengthening of unions in key industries has
created a conflict in public policy between the anti-monopoly intent of the
Sherman Act and the exemption of unions by the Clayton Act.
The Need for Competition
The need to insure competition is paramount to the development of bet-
ter products and services. It also maintains realistic consumer prices. "The
Sherman Act and later legislation recognized that competition is the basic
law of commerce and that to stifle such competition or control an undue
amount of economic power should be forbidden." 51 The balance between
labor and management effects the maintenance of competitive prices and pro-
fit levels by assuring that natural market conditions will adjust these varia-
bles and that they will not be manipulated by an overly powerful party*in
restraint of trade.
If a company were unbridled by the Sherman Act it could conceivably
achieve a monopoly and by controlling the supply affect the demand, thereby
driving the price of its product upward. Yet the provisions of the Clayton
Act permit the unions to occupy precisely this position with respect to the
labor supply.
Competition protects against such market control by the existence of an-
other producer of the product that would be willing to price the commodity
lower in hopes of capturing the market for itself. The Sherman Act also
fosters competition in its anti-conspiracy in restraint of trade provisions.
The balanced union-management relationship would function against the
union in the same way competition and the Sherman Act affect corporations.
Balanced power between the union and management would prevent unions
from withholding labor, or from demanding exorbitant prices for labor's
use.52 Without the type of mandatory restraint provided by the Sherman
Act, unions have proven no more willing to impose self-restraint than has
management.
Multi-Employer Contracts
The inequality of applying the Sherman Act only to management is best il-
lustrated by multi-employer contracts.53 There is a great similarity between
50 Comment, supra note 12, at 311.
51 "Union Monopoly Power", supra note 40 (remarks of Congressman Martin).
52 The regulation of the supply of labor as discussed herein refers to the highly
organized industries such as steel, coal, auto, shipping and trucking.
53 In multi-employer contracts the union acting on a national scale presents a single
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management's collusively fixed price agreement and a multi-employer union
contract where only one price is set for the labor. Despite the implications
of a restraint of trade by creating a fixed price level, the multi-employer con-
tracts are favored by unions and management. Management prefers this
arrangement since they are assured no other company is paying a lower wage.
Unions prefer it since they do not have to fear competition. The result of
these arrangements is that employer collusion although restricted by the
Sherman Act is encouraged by present-day multi-bargaining contracts. In
Pennington, a union was prohibited from acting directly to fix prices by work-
ing with a non-labor group. In multi-employer contracts the same objec-
tive is reached indirectly. The goals of the Sherman Act were consumer pro-
tection and dispersion of private economic power. These goals are frus-
trated by the monopoly power exerted by labor in their "self-interest" areas
through multi-employer agreements.
Wage-Price Spirals
The public suffers whether the fixing of prices is from management col-
lusion or from price setting by unions through multi-employer agreements.
When a balanced union-management relationship is lacking, price fixing re-
sults for much the same reason as when there is no competition between
manufacturers.54 The effect of such activity is a wage-price spiral. "A
wage-price spiral" or "wage-push inflation" occurs where substantial union
power over wages exists. 56 Such a wage-price spiral can totally distort
the financial picture for anyone living on a fixed or substantially fixed in-
come such as welfare recipients, retirees or employees in a non-union com-
pany. "When organized labor gets wage increases in excess of productivity
gains, causing prices to rise, organized labor increases its real purchasing
power while unorganized groups suffer declines in theirs. In the latter
group prices rise but incomes are unchanged."5 6
When one union succeeds in getting an advantageous wage package, other
unions are stimulated to seek a similar package for their membership. In the
highly mechanized mass production industries .the increased wages may be
absorbed and not passed on to the consumers. If the rising cost of labor can-
not readily be absorbed in such mechanized industries the firm may choose to
accelerate its level of mechanization instead of acquiescing to higher wage de-
set of wage rates to all the employers in a given industry. Since all the employers are
charged the same wage costs they need not fear competition and there is no disadvantage
to settling with the union. The public suffers since the increase in wages is passed di-
rectly on to the consumer.
54 Reference here is to the auto, coal, steel, transportation, shipping and related in-
dustries. In industries such as oil, wages and costs are less important bargaining factors
because of the high degree of automation.
55 P. BOARMAN, UNION MANAGEMENT AND ANTITRUsT RESTRAINTS 109 (1963).
56 Id. at 104; see Comment, supra note 12, at 315-16.
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mands. 57 The resultant reduction of the labor force required is readily ap-
parent, particularly in the semi-skilled industries.
The problems arise when workers in the less progressive industries see
the raise their fellow union members have received. "These workers seek
to restore the wage differentials which previously existed but such wage
increases for less productive workers cannot be, absorbed by producers with-
out increases in prices."58  This activity starts the cycle over again. The
increase in wages is reflected in raised prices. People who are receiving
the increased wages maintain a neutral position while those on a fixed in-
come, as stated above, diminish their ability to meet the increased market
prices. "Wage rates set by strategically situated, powerful unions set the
level toward which other rates climb; these centers of power become the ful-
crum from which leverage is extended to raise rates all along the line." 59
The effect of a wage push spiral brought about by an imbalance of power
in a collective bargaining relationship may have an effect on the market-
ability of American goods in the international marketplace. Increased
wages which force the prices of these goods up may cause a reduced de-
mand in the international market due to the availability of lower priced
goods of similar quality from other sources. This may well lead to unem-
ployment in the industries manufacturing such goods which have increased
prices due to the wage increases granted overly powerful unions.
"There seems to be no reason to doubt that the upward pressures [for
wages and benefits] exerted by unions and transmitted to prices through
the law of costs may well proceed at a rate greater than the rate of increase in
productivity for the economy as a whole, with a resulting general rise in
prices." 60  Were this problem to be dealt with through monetary or fiscal
policies it would not be attacking the source. Such efforts would merely be
attempts to create a counter-push by squeezing businessmen so that they in
turn squeeze labor. "An obvious alternative is to diminish the degree of
economic power in the hands of unions."6' 1
Wage-price problems created by labor-management bargaining are not
easily resolved. Before any solutions are undertaken, a study into the causes
and effects of union-management relations and results of previously bar-
gained agreements should be analyzed. The effect of union "micro-eco-
57 See Comment, supra note 12, at 311 n.85.
58 p. BOARmAN, supra note 55, at 109.
59 Schlesinger, Market Structure, Union Power and Inflation, SOUTHERN ECONOmCS
JOURNAL, Jan. 1958, reprinted in W. GALENSON & S. LipSET, LABOR AND TRADE UNION-
ISM 163 (1960).
60 E. CHAmBERLAIN, LABOR UNIONS AND PUBLIC POLICY 29 (1958).
61 Id.
62 Micro-economics is that part of economics which deals with particular firms'
prices, outputs, incomes and expenditure. Emphasis is on individual areas of activity
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nomic' '62 influences in the total "macro-economy", 6 3 if carefully analyzed,
would profit both parties and the public. It is doubtful whether negotiators
have a real grasp of the intricacies of micro and macro-economics sufficient
to temper their demands at the bargaining table.64
Problems with the NLRB
The Wagner Act established the NLRB to balance union and management
bargaining power at a time when management enjoyed a decided edge. The
functioning of the NLRB was to provide not only an enlightened body to de-
cide actual disputes but also to provide guidelines for the future.
One of the primary problems with the NLRB is the changes in policy which
have followed changes in its members after presidential appointments. Even if
the Board exercised its rule-making functions the changes of administrations
would leave unions and management in the dark as to the applicability of
prior decisions of the Board. The intervention of the NLRB into labor-
management relations was originally a well-founded incursion. Now the
Board is often merely an extension of the political party in office and ends up
being a tool to express that party's views on labor-management relations.
The need for labor-management legislation was founded on much more
basic and important issues than the changing views of political parties. Such
legislation was sponsored to heal economic ills and to assure positions of
equal bargaining power for the parties who play such a large part in deter-
mining the economic well being of the nation.
The Time to Act
Analysis of the specific problems existing in the basic collective bargaining
area leaves one convinced that conditions have radically changed since the
government first became involved in the field. No longer is it possible to
realistically cast unions in the role of the struggling weakling.
Since the government's purpose, expressed in the Sherman Antitrust Act,
was to maintain free competition and prevent powerful monopolies from de-
veloping, some consideration ought now be given to union monopolies which
have control over the nation's labor. The ALF-CIO is a single union which
is divided into many smaller units. There are thousands of independent pol-
icy-making employers but rarely is there a single management group which
speaks for all the smaller management units in the same way the AFL-CIO
such as a single firm or household as opposed to all the firms in an industry or house-
holds in the nation. K. BOULDING, EcoNoMIc ANALysis 1 (1966).
63 Macro-economics is that part of economics which deals with general economics and
studies the overall averages as aggregates of the economic system. Emphasis is on the
study of economic systems as a whole especially with reference to their general levels of
output and income and the interrelations among sectors of the economy. Id.
64 See Comment, supra note 12, at 316 n.103.
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speaks for labor. "Labor monopoly vastly outreaches employer monop-
sony. 
'65
As previously stated, one purpose of the Clayton Act was to permit union
organization during the early days of union activity. Today the unions, in
most cases, no longer require this permissive approach and the policy behind
the "labor not a commodity" argument does not have the same conviction
as it may have had in 1914. Rather than attempt to apply the Sherman
Act to present-day unions it would be better to draft new legislation. Such
legislation should be drafted especially to deal with modem unions and
could better cope with the present labor-management relationship than the
Sherman Act.
Once the government steps into the area of private law making and passes
legislation to permit more equitable dealings between parties in the private
sector it is also its duty to carefully observe these areas in order to take fur-
ther measures necessary to assure that an equitable balance continues. The
willingness of government to promote collective bargaining legislation should
also include the willingness to refrain from intervention when it sacrifices
the best interests of the parties. The role of government should not be in-
tervention to regulate substantive issues, but to regulate procedural issues.
In other words the government should provide the tools whereby the parties
are brought together but should not determine for one, or both, of the parties
how they should be utilized. The key to successful collective bargaining is
a workable agreement arrived at by the parties themselves. To achieve this
result further government action is necessary. The time to act is now.
The public is already beginning to favor government intervention in tra-
ditionally free collective bargaining relationships. This attitude has devel-
oped due to hostility toward pressures exerted by unions in attaining bargain-
ing demands. 66 The public desires better protection against the disruption
of industries which cause severe and immediate effects to their interests
(for example, the airplane, disposal and teacher strikes). Unless the parties
can resolve this problem the government will eventually submit to public
pressure and intervene.
If the government were to intervene, broad changes to restore equality in
union-management relationships would be required. Changes as broad as
the Wagner or Taft-Hartley Acts may be necessary. Unless a new policy were
established any remedy would only be temporary and such a truncated effort
would probably serve to hamper the relationship of union-management
bargaining. The present "emergency injunction" powers under the NLRA
are examples of temporary intervention by government that has a question-
able effect on aiding the union-management relationship. Such injunctions
O5 p. BoARMAN, supra note 55, at 114.
00 Clousson, The Changing Visage of Collective Bargaining--Can Public Interven-
tion be Restrained?, 56 ILL. B.J. 818 (1968).
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can forestall a crisis but may have no real effect on restoring equality to
the bargaining relationship.
What steps might now be taken to achieve the goals the government has
sought to accomplish?
ALTERNATIVES
Matching the Parties
The bargaining scope of a union might be required to correspond to that of
the individual corporation or plant within the industries with which they pre-
viously bargained. This approach would serve to more evenly match the
power of labor and management at the bargaining table, thus avoiding the
inherent dangers of multi-employer bargaining.
While quantitative analysis of a labor organization is often utilized, this is
merely an indicator of several factors which may signal the danger of po-
tential abuse. The only meaningful approach is qualitative analysis of these
factors. The question to be answered is whether particular labor organiza-
tions have either created monopolies, or are capable of creating monopo-
lies, by their ability to do three things:
(1) to compel their members to submit to commands and to take away jobs or
fine them if they do not obey; (2) to force up the price that the consumer must
pay; and (3) to curtail the product or service and therefore stop job opportuni-
ties. 67
The primary purpose in limiting the size and power of a union is not to de-
stroy its bargaining position, but to reduce the problems of national, re-
gional, or industry-wide bargaining where one union bargains with all com-
panies and has the power to strike every factory or business in that industry
or region. "Industry-wide bargaining power used by a single union-like
in the steel, auto, coal, shipping or trucking industries-means a monopoly
over the workers. This causes monopoly wage price setting, inflation or the
alternate, national emergency strikes." 68 The adverse consequences of such
power will not only effect the economy as a whole, but ultimately the con-
sumer.
The need for such fragmentation is apparent when one considers that the
power of management and labor is not equal. Management of one com-
pany has no meaningful control or authority over the direction manage-
ment of another company must follow. It cannot shut down an entire indus-
try, however "the union's monopoly power is complete, it can control the
work of each employee in all plants in an industry regardless of who owns
them or where they are located." 69
A recent example of such union power over an industry is the September,
1970 strike against General Motors by the United Auto Workers. "Con-
67 "Union Monopoly Power", supra note 40 (remarks of Senator Thurmond).
68 Id. (remarks of Congressman Martin).
69 Id.
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tracts with common expiration dates with the 'Big Three' auto producers
were won by Walter Reuther in the middle 1950's."70 In this instance the
"Big Three" had given their proposals to the U.A.W., which had them re-
jected by the council of representatives composed of workers from each of
the employers. Thereafter the union named General Motors as its strike tar-
get. The U.A.W. could have struck all three producers. "Originally a
joint attack against General Motors and Chrysler had been planned." 71
The advantage of smaller units and local level settlement is that a local
union which deals with a company is in the best position to know what it
takes to solve their differences. When workers in the locality settle disputes
the "local" public interests are more clearly defined as opposed to disputes
where the decisions are made by a union officer hundreds or thousands of
miles away in a national or international union's main office.
If strikes took place they would tend to be of a local nature since bar-
gaining would be confined to one area or one company and therefore an en-
tire industry, region or the United States would not be tied up. The public
could buy products or travel as they chose even if one of the companies was
struck or closed down. The pressure would not come from the union as much
as from the company's knowledge that its competitors were still producing
and making a profit while it was being struck. This knowledge might bring
about a speedy settlement. In an industry-wide regional or national strike
all the companies are being struck and a resulting status quo exists among
them. In this situation the companies are hurt as a whole, but none is hurt
any more or less than its competitor. The public is the victim in these
strikes because it is prevented from obtaining the goods or services from an
alternate source. Local bargaining units would obviate this problem and re-
store the element of competition to the settlement of such disputes.
Limiting the Topics
A second approach would be to limit the topics which could be considered
in the collective bargaining. Caution would have to be used in eliminating
topics so as not to hamstring the union or management parties in light of
Taft-Hartley's permissible bargaining areas under Section 8(d).
72
One way topics could be limited or done away with entirely would be to
overrule United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company.73
This case adversely affected the ability of employers to conduct their busi-
nesses in an efficient manner, free from union intervention. The case sub-
jected previous "management prerogatives" to a process of review by arbitra-
tion. This was accomplished by giving the standard arbitration clause
70 Wall Street Journal, Sept. 2, 1970, at 3.
71 Id. at 2.
72 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
73 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
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broad and all-inclusive construction and coverage. Previously courts only
compelled arbitration of disputes which the parties had "expressly" com-
mitted to the arbitration process. They would not imply that a topic was
arbitrable. This entire approach was reversed after Warrior & Gulf.74
This case arose because the collective bargaining contract contained a gen-
eral clause excluding from arbitration all matters strictly functions of man-
agement. Thereafter management began contracting out work formerly
done by the union employees. The union disputed management's right un-
der the collective bargaining contract to engage in this labor practice. When
the employer refused to submit this grievance to arbitration, suit was brought
in the United States district court to compel arbitration. Upon finding
that management's conduct fell within the broad exception clause contained
in the collective bargaining agreement, the court concluded that the griev-
ance was not subject to arbitration.7 5
In its reversal the Supreme Court held that since the collective bargain-
ing agreement failed to expressly exclude the employee's grievance from an
arbitration settlement, arbitration was compellable. I
The new approach after Warrior & Gulf was that apart from matters the
parties "specifically exclude" all parts of the contract could be subjected
to collective bargaining. The old contracts were opened up to arbitration.
Management had to go back to the bargaining table and renegotiate so as to
remove areas from the sphere of the newly imposed arbitration. By over-
ruling the Warrior & Gulf trilogy there would be arbitration only on those
subjects actually contemplated and agreed upon by the parties.
Third Party Intervention
Finally the process of collective bargaining itself might be altered to ac-
commodate a third party who would enforce compulsory arbitration on be-
half of the public's substantial interests. This alternative has merit only so
long as the interests of the public are not permitted to totally dominate the
collective bargaining relationship. An arbitrator must have the ability to
weigh the demands of the parties against the public interest and not interfere
with the negotiations of the parties unless a severe hardship on the public's
interest is obvious. The goal of collective bargaining is to have the parties
involved settle their own disagreements. Third party intervention should
be permitted only with caution in order to allow the greatest amount of flexi-
bility and freedom when the two bargaining parties can interact.
Third party intervention could be initiated at some point prior to the need
for arbitration. Possibly the "cooling off' period for strikes which threaten
the national health or security under the Taft-Hartley Act would be an
74 See Clousson, supra note 66, at 819.
75 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 168 F. Supp. 702
(S.D. Ala 1958).
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opportune time for such intervention to take place. The implementation
of such an alternative would probably require new legislation.
NLRB Member Selection
If a remedy were sought to the problem of Board members reflecting the
views of the President who appointed them at least three different approaches
could be followed. First, the power of appointing Board members could be
retained by the President while restricting the number of appointments he
could make during each term of office. In conjunction with this approach
the terms of the members might be staggered in such a way that a majority
could never be achieved by any one President's appointments. Since the
President may serve two consecutive terms in office it might be necessary
to increase the number of Board members so that he could appoint replace-
ments but could not succeed in appointing a majority. If for example the
number of Board members were increased to nine and their five-year terms
were staggered so that a new term began every two years, a President serving
two terms could make only four appointments. Under the present system a
two-term President can appoint a totally new Board over an eight-year
term in office.
A second approach to curb this practice might be to develop a "labor
court" patterned after the Court of Claims and the Customs Court. This spe-
cialized court would have judges with life tenure, subject to good behavior.
The Court of Claims and the Customs Court are among the inferior courts es-
tablished by Congress under Article III of the Constitution. These two courts
are illustrative of courts which are devoted to a single, specialized area of the
law. These courts have no jurisdiction outside their respective subject
areas.
The Customs Court is especially interesting because of the manner in
which its nine judges are divided into three separate divisions. Each di-
vision is assigned certain paragraphs of the tariff and revenue acts and this
determines to which division protest cases are assigned.76 Such a divi-
sion of labor permits the panel of three judges77 to become specialists within
an already specialized court in order to more capably deal with the issues pre-
sented. This feature would be especially desirable in labor relations.
The third approach to solving the Board's problems would be to permit
representatives of both management and unions to select the members of the
Board in the same manner in which mediators are now selected. Each side
selects one member and then a third member would be selected by their
chosen representatives or the two parties would have to agree on a third
76 3 WEsT's FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 4226 (2d ed. 1970).
77 Protests are normally heard by an entire division of three judges in New York
City, the headquarters of the court. Single judge hearings are also conducted at Ports of
Entry and then reviewed by an entire division in New York. Id.
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selection. The process of selection utilizing this approach would involve a
monumental effort by unions and management. Success is possible, how-
ever, and could result in a Board which was more attuned to the problems of
the parties and more willing to give the direction which the Board was au-
thorized to provide.
The successful use of such an approach would favorably affect the public's
third party interests. A better balanced relationship between representa-
tives of union and management will permit a reduction in wage-price spirals,
the products of unbalanced relationships, and protect the public from being
forced to assume the burden of a higher wage or an increased product price.
Voluntary Arbitration
One solution which has already met with limited success is self-imposed
voluntary arbitration. In the absence of a complete legislative remedy con-
cerning existing problems between unions and management it is in accord
with the Wagner Act to allow the parties to resolve their disputes. Self-
imposed arbitration permits this goal.7 8 The impending threat of further
government action may encourage more widespread use of this approach.
Such increased use of self-imposed arbitration might act as the necessary
catalyst to motivate unions and management toward "results oriented" bar-
gaining in order to obviate the need to arbitrate.
Approval of arbitration as a means of solving disputes has been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court of the United States.79 The parties to collec-
tive bargaining agreements usually prefer this method over submission of a
dispute to the NLRB or to the courts, the usual bodies which provide the in-
tervention which the public seeks. A total of 94 percent of all labor agree-
ments presently contain arbitration clauses.8 0 Unions and management
also prefer arbitration over the NLRB and courts because the arbitrator is
familiar with the history of the particular union-management relationship and
gives greater effect to the expectations of the parties than either NLRB or
courts. 81
A drawback to arbitration as well as allowing a matter to go to the NLRB,
or the courts, is that the parties may have previously taken extreme positions
on various issues and then refused to relinquish any ground hoping that the
arbitrator or court will choose a middle ground between both extremes.
This strategy generally leads to agreements in which neither side is satisfied.8 2
78 See Casey & O'Neill, A Comparison of the Law Governing Labor Relations in
the United States and the United Kingdom, 44 TuL. L. REv. 67, 90-92 (1969).
79 See United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
80 Bond, The Concurrence Conundrum: The Overlapping Jurisdiction of Arbitra-
tion and the NLRB, 42 S. CAL. L. REv. 4, 17 (1969).
81 Id.
82 See Rains, Dispute Settlement in the Public Sector, 19 BUFF. L. REV. 279 (1969-
70).
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Bargaining parties may also depend on the ability of the government to
"make things right" in their favor. Such dependence results in forestall-
ing the dependent party from fully executing his responsibility at the bar-
gaining table. A union may well refuse to bargain on a topic, wait for man-
agement to file an unfair labor practice complaint and be assured of getting
into another forum "where they might possibly get a better deal than if they
had bargained with management. ' 83
Voluntary arbitration can be a useful tool to assist collective bargaining
when selectively used by the bargaining parties. If subjects are predeter-
mined to be arbitrable the parties may circumvent the need for government
intervention. Self-imposed arbitration provides localism and flexibility in
the relationship between the union and management. By submitting to their
own form of arbitration the parties succeed in keeping the dispute within
the union-management family relationship.
Voluntary arbitration does provide solutions to some problems between the
parties. However, it does not solve the disparity of bargaining power which
may exist between unions and management. The subjects of voluntary ar-
bitration are only as broad or narrow as the parties were able to bargain for.
If one party is weaker its interests will not be given full attention in arbitra-
tion.
The NLRB is authorized under the Wagner Act to consider only the con-
tract and not the parties' prior relationships. When an arbitration clause is
included in a collectively bargained agreement the parties are assured of
more flexible attention from the arbitrator to their respective problems.
Widespread use of voluntary arbitration would constitute a self-restraint
of unions because of the availability of these other forums. The likelihood
of such self-imposed restraints is slight. It is doubtful if the unions are any
more ready to curb their appetites for greater benefits and wages than the
corporations were for greater profits in the early and middle 1900's. In the
absence of self-restraint by the unions to curb their tremendous power
there are no checks on their monopolistic manipulation of labor.
The Most Reasonable Offer
A solution to the problem of parties taking extreme positions and one that
would force the parties to bargain in good faith is for the arbitrator or court
to accept the most reasonable final offer of one of the parties.8 4 This
would place the onus on each party to arrive at and seek a reasonable list
of demands. The goal would be reasonableness with the most reasonable
83 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
84 Rains, supra note 82, at 284-85.
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demand being accepted by the fact finder. The parties would be forced to
make their priorities clear and would thereby give the fact finder, arbitrator
or court, more information upon which to base a decision. Factors to con-
sider in order to determine reasonableness would be: the amount or type of
demand considering industry patterns and past experiences of the fact
finder; increased or absence of increased productivity to match wage de-
mands; the individual and internal problems of the parties that either sup-
port or fail to support their basis for a demand.
When the parties know that their ultimate offer is going to be weighed
against the opposition's on the basis of reasonableness their conduct at the
bargaining table will be affected. The most desirable and most likely impact
of such a solution will be for each party to retract from unrealistic positions in
advance of confronting its opposition and the arbitrator. The parties would
not be afforded the luxury of maintaining an obtuse position far removed
from a reasonable position. The bargaining would revolve around a more
compatible common ground than around the previously polarized positions
of union and management.8 5
CONCLUSION
Although various solutions to economic problems have been proposed, it
is not suggested that they should all be applied either with equal force or
at the same time. Some may be harmoniously implemented while others
must be applied individually to prevent undesirable side effects.
The thrust of these alternatives has been balancing the power be-
tween unions and management. In summary, three distinct approaches have
been considered.
I. Balancing Bargaining Power
A. Matching the parties by localized bargaining where economic
power is balanced;
B. Limiting the topics which are bargainable;
C. Self-imposed voluntary arbitration;
D. Most reasonable final offer.
H. Enforcing the Public's Interest
A. Third party intervention;
B. New legislation.
III. Revision/Replacement of the NLRB
A. Staggering terms of members to control presidential appoint-
ments;
85 Id. at 285.
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B. Increasing the size of the Board;
C. A labor court similar to Court of Claims or Customs Court;
D. Board selection by union and management.
In considering area I, it is possible to take the suggestions individually and
harmonize them to produce a notably improved bargaining relationship.
However, it might not be necessary to utilize all the approaches in area I in
order to achieve the desired balance between the parties. The need for ar-
bitration, be it self-imposed or compulsory, might never arise once the par-
ties were matched in economic power and had clearly defined the topics to
be opened to collective bargaining. For this reason only one item should
be attempted at a time in order to minimize unnecessary government ac-
tion.
Area H is the broadest, and for that reason is most likely to involve eco-
nomic side effects. A congressional enactment aimed directly at unions which
exert monopolistic pressures would be a deep incursion into existing union-
management relationships. This could lead to a multiplicity of new prob-
lems for the bargaining parties and the third party public interests. None-
theless such a course should be considered at this time. Such an approach
would conceivably incorporate some of the methods suggested in the third
area dealing with Board revision or replacement.
The proposed solutions offered in area III are intended to be used to-
gether to achieve the desired result. If the National Labor Relation Act were
amended to create a labor court to enforce its provisions, the redirection of
parties to this forum would not be difficult. Curbing presidential appoint-
ment powers could also be accomplished without burdening the system.
Suggestions in area III could supplement area I if necessary. It would
be unrealistic to conclude that the suggestions in area I would obviate the
need for a system of review.
In order for unions and management to collectively bargain successfully a
balance of powers and interests must be maintained. The federal govern-
ment has the primary responsibility to maintain this balance. A failure to
act now will result in continued abuses as a result of the excessive demands
of the more powerful of the two parties, the unions.
Frank E. Gumbinger
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